Organization theorists have long argued that the management of uncertainty may be a major motive of organizational behavior. Military organizations must deal with very high levels of uncertainty. Some uncertainty comes from the international political environment that provides the Military organizations life; some arises from the likelihood of direct intervention by formal authorities upon whom the organization depends for critical resources; some emerges from the mixed motives of organizational participants; some arises from the very fact that Military organizations don't get much realistic practice; and a few arises from the very nature of combat. Doctrine is one among the various ways in which militaries address these uncertainties. But doctrine writers make tradeoffs among these problems, tradeoffs that are themselves reflective of the politics of the moment. Military organizations that face the prospect of actual combat need a set of institutionalized principles about how to fight. Modern militaries call this set of principles doctrine. Doctrine exists at almost every level of military activity, from the lowly infantry company to the nuclear forces of a Cold War superpower. But it is high-level doctrine, which encompasses all of a state’s military power, that has perhaps most captured the interest of political scientists, historians, and military theorists. There is no agreed term for this subject. It is sometimes called ‘joint doctrine’, because it must specify how various branches will cooperate, usually in large campaigns. It is sometimes called ‘political military doctrine’.